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This paper argues that terrorism, beyond its immediate impact on innocent victims, also 
raises the costs of crime, and therefore, imposes a negative externality on potential 
criminals. Terrorism raises the costs of crime through two channels: (i) by increasing the 
presence and activity of the police force, and (ii) causing more people to stay at home rather 
than going out for leisure activities. Our analysis exploits a panel of 120 fatal terror attacks 
and all reported crimes for 17 districts throughout Israel between 2000 and 2005. After 
controlling for the fixed-effect of each district and for district-specific time trends, we show 
that terror attacks reduce property crimes such as burglary, auto-theft, and thefts-from-cars. 
Terror also reduces assaults and aggravated assaults which occur in private homes, but 
increases incidents of trespassing and "disrupting the police." Taken as a whole, the results 
are consistent with a stronger deterrence effect produced by an increased police presence 
after a terror attack. A higher level of policing is likely to catch more people trespassing, and 
at the same time, reduce the number of property crimes. The decline in crimes committed in 
private houses is likely an indication that the tendency for individuals to stay home after a 
terror attack further increases the costs of crime. 
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I.  Introduction   
In recent years, a burgeoning literature has emerged on estimating the 
consequences of terrorism on the economy. Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) examined 
this issue in the context of Spain, while the case of Israel has been examined by Eckstein 
and Tsiddon (2004), Berrebi and Klor (2009), and Eldor and Melnick (2004). Recent 
research has also focused on how terror affects individual behavior. For example, Becker 
and Rubinstein (2007) show that individuals over-react to incidents of terrorism in a 
manner wildly disproportionate to the miniscule chances of being a victim in such an 
attack. Stecklov and Goldstein (2004) find that fatal traffic accident rates in Israel exhibit 
a steep rise shortly after terror attacks. 
Yet, one dimension that has received little attention is whether terror affects crime 
rates. If terror attacks affect the level of crime or types of crimes that are committed, this 
suggests that there is an indirect mechanism, in addition to the direct loss of life and 
property damage, through which society is affected by terror. During the period between 
2000 and 2005, Israelis experienced over 100 fatal terror attacks. Our paper is the first to 
study the temporal and spatial impact of terror on a wide range of crimes at the national 
level, using daily data on all crimes committed in Israel from 2000 to 2005. The large 
number of attacks, combined with data on every crime reported in Israel during the same 
period, provides a unique opportunity to study how crime levels respond to terror. 
Our empirical analysis employs a daily panel of terror incidents and various 
categories of criminal activity for 17 subdistricts throughout Israel. The data contain 
information on the location and number of casualties from 120 terror attacks in Israel   2
from October 2000 through December 2005. A "terror attack" in our analysis is defined 
as having at least one fatality, but we also test whether larger attacks (with five or more 
fatalities) produce stronger or weaker effects.  
After controlling for the fixed-effect of each subdistrict and subdistrict-specific 
time trends, the results show that terror in Israel significantly reduces property crimes 
such as burglary, auto-theft, and thefts-from-cars. These reductions occur on the day of 
the attack and for up to five days afterwards. It should be noted that burglary and thefts-
from-cars are the two most common types of crime, and auto-theft is the fourth most 
common (assault is number three). Terror does not seem to have a strong effect on sexual 
or violent crimes, although there does appear to be a reduction in assaults and aggravated 
assaults occurring in private homes. In addition, there is evidence that terror induces an 
increase in incidents of trespassing and disrupting the police.  
The pattern of results across distinct types of crimes allows us to evaluate the 
relevance of various channels through which terror may affect crime. These channels are 
discussed in detail in the next section, but they generally fall into two broad categories: 
(1) those affecting the cost of committing crime, or (2) those influencing the propensity 
of criminals to commit crime.  Terror affects the costs of crime primarily by the increased 
police presence on the streets after an attack (Levitt 1997; Di Tella and Schargrodsky 
2004; Evans and Owens 2007).  However, people also tend to stay home after an attack, 
and this raises the cost of committing crimes – particularly in private residences relative 
to public places (Cohen and Felson 1979; Cohen, Felson et al. 1980; Hipp, Bauer et al. 
2004).  Terror may also affect the propensity to commit crime in both directions.  Terror 
may increase an individual’s sense of social solidarity, which should reduce the   3
motivation to commit crimes against fellow citizens (Cullen 1994; Landau 1997). 
However, if terror attacks increase social stress or risk-taking behavior, this could lead to 
higher levels of crime.   
Overall, our results do not show that terror increases crimes levels.  As such, our 
findings refute the argument that terror increases crime levels through increased social 
stress or risk-taking behavior.  Instead, our results are consistent with terror raising the 
costs of crime -- through increased policing or changes in leisure activities after an attack.  
Both of these factors are likely to reduce property crimes, such as burglaries, in private 
homes.  However, the reduction in assaults and aggravated assaults committed in private 
homes is most likely due to a change in leisure activities (staying at home more often), 
since the presence of more police on the streets is unlikely to strongly affect crimes 
committed in private homes. It is possible that an increasing sense of social solidarity 
contributed to the reduction in crimes committed in private homes, but this mechanism is 
inconsistent with the lack of any reduction in violent crimes committed in public places.  
The reduction in property crime committed in public places is likely due to the 
increasing presence of police. Further evidence in support of the police size effect is 
provided by the increasing public incidents of trespassing and "disrupting the police" 
after a terror attack.  A higher presence of police after an attack should reduce property 
crime, while at the same time increase the chances of catching someone trespassing.  
Also, more police on the streets should increase the number of interactions between 
citizens and police officers in public places, thus raising the probability that a "disruption 
of the police" occurs. The positive impact of terror on police activity is consistent with 
our analysis of the Israeli Labor Force Surveys (LFS) from 2000-2005, which shows that   4
a local terror attack increases the probability that a police officer works overtime during 
the week of the attack. Taken as whole, the results strongly indicate that terrorists raise 
the costs of crime, and therefore, impose a negative externality on potential criminals. 
No existing paper examines the systematic response of various types of crime to a 
sustained wave of terror. The most related papers are by Di Tella and Schargrodsky 
(2004), Klick and Tabarrok (2005), and a recent paper by Draca, Machin, and Witt 
(2008). These papers use terror (or terror warnings) as an instrument for police presence, 
and test whether increased police forces affect crime. More specifically, Di Tella and 
Schargrodsky (2004) use the incidence of a single terror attack in Argentina to estimate 
how the increased police presence at specific potential targets for future terrorist acts 
(Jewish centers) affected the reported number of car thefts around the specified targets. 
Klick and Tabarrok (2005) use four changes in the terror alert level in Washington D.C. 
to study the effect of changes in the warning level on nine different types of crime. Draca, 
Machin, and Witt (2008) examine the effect of police on various types of crime by using 
the terror attack in London in 2005 as an instrument for police deployment in London 
versus outlying areas in the subsequent weeks after the attack.   
Similar to these papers, we use high frequency variation in the data (at the daily 
level) to see how terror affects crime. However, in contrast to this literature, we examine 
a much wider array of crimes and exploit a total of 120 fatal terror attacks to examine 
their effect on crime. In addition, we exploit the geographic variation of terror incidents 
across the entire country in order to see whether crimes are differentially affected 
according to whether they occurred in the same district as the terror attack or whether 
they occurred farther away. Finally, our study contributes to the literature by exploiting   5
information on the location of each crime (public places versus private homes) and the 
relationship between the perpetrator and the victim (whether they are acquainted or not). 
This additional information allows us to further explore the likely channels through 
which terror may be affecting crime.  
The next section describes the mechanisms through which terror may affect 
crime, while Section III describes our unique data.  Section IV describes the empirical 
methodology. Section V presents the main results and Section VI extends the analysis by 
exploiting information on the location of the crime (whether the crime was committed in 
a public place versus a private residence) and the relationship between the victim and 
perpetrator (if they knew each other or not). Section VII concludes. 
 
II.  Mechanisms that May Underlie the Terror and Crime Relationship 
The causal effect of police on crime has been intensely debated, although most of 
the recent evidence points to a negative relationship (Levitt 1997; Di Tella and 
Schargrodsky 2004; Evans and Owens 2007). One obvious way that terror may affect 
crime is through an increase in police reinforcements on the streets after an attack, which 
should raise the risk of apprehension. However, the magnitude of the effect may vary by 
type of crime (Corman and Mocan 2000). Property crimes, for example, are more likely 
to be affected by policing levels than crimes of violence or passion. Furthermore, the 
degree to which the costs of crime increase with police size should be related to the 
location of the crime. For example, an increasing police presence is more likely to affect 
crimes committed in public places (stores, parks, streets, etc) versus private homes. Thus,   6
the strongest effects of increased policing on crime rates should be observed in property 
crimes and crimes that are committed in public – and the weakest for crimes of passion or 
crimes that occur in private homes.
1   
Empirical evidence in support of an increased police presence in response to 
terror is provided by Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004), Klick and Tabarrok (2005), and a 
recent paper  by Draca, Machin, and Witt (2008).  In the Israeli context, however, police 
data are difficult to obtain. Therefore, we use data from the Israel Labor Force Surveys 
(2000-2005), which contain a random sample of individuals with information on their 
occupation, demographic characteristics, district of residence, labor force information in 
the last week, and the week of the interview.  By matching the week of the interview with 
incidents of terror in their district of residence, we can test whether police officers 
increase their work hours following terror attacks.  Descriptive statistics for the sample 
are presented in Table 1, and the regression results appear in Table 2.   
The first column in Table 2 shows that a “local” terror attack (an attack with at 
least one fatality within the respondent’s district of residence) increases the probability of 
working overtime by about six percentage points, after controlling for the person’s age, 
education, number of children, sex, dummies for each year, and fixed-effects for district 
of residence.  This is a large increase, relative to an average of only 10 percent working 
overtime in Table 1.  However, if there was an attack with at least 5 fatalities, the 
probability increases by 20.2 percentage points (column 2).  This effect increases to 23.5 
percentage points if the attack resulted in at least 10 fatalities (column 3).  In contrast, 
                                                  
1 A large increase in non-police security following terror attacks, particularly outside public entertainment 
establishments, provides another layer of security presence that is rapidly increased following terror 
attacks.    7
Table 2 shows that attacks in districts outside of the person’s residence do not affect the 
probability of working overtime. The last two columns confirm these patterns by showing 
that the probability of working overtime increases with a local attack, and the effect 
increases linearly with the number of fatalities.  Therefore, the evidence is consistent with 
the idea that the Israeli police does increase its presence in areas hit by terror attacks, and 
in this sense, the cost of committing crime should increase as well.
2 These findings are 
also consistent with evaluations of policing strategies against terror within Israel 
(Weisburd, Jonathan, and Perry (forthcoming)). 
The other mechanism through which terror may influence the costs of crime is by 
altering the daily routines and leisure choices of individuals in the wake of an attack.  
Sociologists argue that changes in routines have influenced the long-term changes in 
crime patterns (Cohen and Felson 1979; Cohen, Felson et al. 1980; Hipp, Bauer et al. 
2004). For example, the increase in burglaries during the 1970's and 1980's can possibly 
been explained by the increasing tendency for both spouses to be at work during the day, 
thus leaving their homes vulnerable to potential criminals. This idea can be extrapolated 
to the present context -- the costs of crime may increase after a terror attack if more 
people stay at home rather than go out to bars, restaurants, and other forms of 
entertainment. Such a shift in leisure is consistent with the empirical evidence. Stecklov 
and Goldstein (2004) show that traffic volume on the roads in Israel declines for 2-3 days 
following an attack, with steeper declines in response to larger attacks. Becker and 
Rubinstein (2007) show that terror attacks induce a significant decline in bus tickets sold, 
expenditures on taxis, and expenditures in restaurants, coffee shops, and pubs. The 
                                                  
2 It should be noted, however, that terror could reduce the costs of crime if the police concentrate more of 
their resources on catching terrorists as opposed to criminals.    8
evidence also shows that sales in a chain of Jerusalem coffee shops decline in the days 
following attacks, particularly in locations more open to attacks such as those in city 
centers (Spilerman and Stecklov 2009). In addition, they find that the decline in sales is 
larger after more fatal attacks.  These results strongly suggest that individuals tend to stay 
at home after an attack and even more so after larger attacks – most likely in order to 
reduce their exposure to further attacks. As a result, the costs of crime increase as homes 
are more difficult to enter unnoticed and people tend to have more family, friends, and 
neighbors in the vicinity, thus providing another layer of security and protection. This 
mechanism, however, should primarily cause a decline in crimes committed in private 
residences, with little effect on crimes committed in public spaces. 
Beyond affecting the cost of crime, terror may also affect the propensity to 
commit crime.  The literature in sociology and criminology offers a variety of reasons for 
this, sometimes with predicted effects in opposite directions. One potential mechanism is 
that terror may increase social solidarity and social cohesion (National Research Council 
2003; Collins 2004), which should reduce the motivation to commit crimes against fellow 
citizens (Cullen 1994; Landau 1997). However, an opposing effect could be produced by 
an increase in social stress and anxiety, leading to greater internal social conflict. Support 
for the idea of increased social stress comes from studies on the social consequences of 
natural disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina, where intense levels of social conflict and 
criminality were registered alongside acts of heroism and social solidarity (Tierney 
2007).
3 Recent findings also point to increased levels of anxiety and stress following the 
September 11
th terrorist attacks (Lee, Isaac et al. 2002; Schlenger, Caddell et al. 2002; 
                                                  
3 Indirect support for the positive association between social stress and crime is provided by the evidence 
on the effect of economic stress on crime (Raphael and Winter-Ebmer 2001; Gould, Weinberg et al. 2002).   9
Silver, Holman et al. 2002).
4  Landau and Pfefferman (1988) present time-series evidence 
from Israel which is consistent with a positive association between social stress and 
crime. Overall, increasing stress and social solidarity generate opposite predictions on 
criminal behavior, but each one is likely to be more relevant for crimes involving 
personal interactions (assault, sexual assault, etc.) than crimes with an economic motive 
(property crimes).  
Another potential factor on the propensity to commit crime could be due to 
increased risk-taking behavior in response to a prolonged exposure to terror in Israel (Pat-
Horenczyk, Peled et al. 2007). This mechanism is consistent with theoretical predictions 
that risk-taking behavior should increase with the level of mortality risk (Liu and 
Rettenmaier 2007). Criminal activities, which are inherently risky, offer one natural 
outlet for such a reaction to terror.  
Overall, our results do not show that terror increases crime levels.  As such, our 
findings clearly refute the argument that terror increases the propensity for crime by 
increasing social stress or risk-taking behavior.  However, the rest of the paper 
investigates the effect of terror in each type of crime, and assess whether the pattern of 




                                                  
4 In Israel, studies have shown a relatively muted response to terror when using psychological stress 
indicators, although there are signs of heterogeneity across different segments of the population (Bleich, 
Gelkopf et al. 2006; Shalev, Tuval et al. 2006).   10
III.   The Crime and Terror Data   
The main analysis is based on two primary sources of data. The first is data on 
criminal activity from the Ministry of Internal Security, which was obtained for the 
period starting from October 2000 through December 2005. Thus, the sample period 
starts at the beginning of the "Second Intifada", which unleashed a large wave of terrorist 
activity within Israel, and continues through the end of 2005 when terror attacks within 
Israel had mostly subsided. The crime data were obtained directly from the database of 
the Police Department and include every crime reported during this five year period. For 
each crime, information was provided regarding the date and type of crime, relationship 
between victim and offender (where available), geographic location of the crime (name 
of the locality), and type of location (residential building, commercial property, street, 
etc). The file includes information on a total of 3,279,882 incidents of crime spread out 
over 158 different types of crime. Each day, an average of 1,619 incidents of crime are 
reported to the police. 
Because many of the crimes in the database rarely occur, we concentrate our 
analysis on 13 specific types of crime which can be classified more broadly into four 
main categories: property crimes (burglary, robbery, auto theft, and "theft from an auto"), 
violent crimes (murder, assault, and aggravated assault), sexual crimes (rape and sexual 
assault), and crimes of public disobedience (trespassing, public disorder, attacking or 
disrupting the police, and disturbing the peace).
5 Use of these categories, which are the 
                                                  
5 In addition to being rare, many of the detailed types of crime (spying, blackmail, etc.) are unlikely to be 
related to a specific event on a given day. Other crimes like bribery may be assigned a specific date of 
occurrence, but the crimes themselves and the lag between when they were planned and carried out will 
make it very difficult to expect any relationship to terror attacks.  
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most common types of crime, allows us to examine whether the effect of terror on crime 
depends on the motives underlying the crime. For example, property crimes are primarily 
motivated by financial gain, while violent and sexual crimes have little to do with 
monetary incentives. These latter crimes are motivated more by personal conflicts and 
psychological issues, and therefore, we expect that they will be less affected by the costs 
associated with an increasing police presence than property crimes. Variation in the 
motives behind each of these types of crimes will allow us to see not only if terror affects 
crime, but also to illuminate the likely channels.   
Table 3 presents summary statistics for the crime data.
6 The most prevalent types 
of crimes are "theft from an auto", burglary, and assault. Lagging much further behind 
these three categories are auto-theft, trespassing, and public disorder. The least common 
crimes are murder, aggravated assault, robbery, rape, sexual assault, and attacking the 
police. Similar to many other countries, the incidence of a particular type of crime 
decreases with its severity. Therefore, although rape and murder may occur very 
infrequently, the high social cost of these types of crimes make them worthwhile to 
analyze. 
In order to better understand the causality between terror and crime, we exploit 
several aspects of our unique data. In particular, we utilize information on the location of 
each incident of crime and terror, by dividing the country into 17 subdistricts (the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip are not included).
7 Information on the geographic location of the 
                                                  
6 Distinct crime categories are constructed for rapes, sexual assaults and murders that are between persons 
acquainted with each other.  We include these as separate crimes and discuss them further below. 
7  The list includes Jerusalem, Tsfat, Kineret, Afula, Acco, Nazareth, Haifa, Hadera, Sharon, Petach Tikva, 
Ramle, Rehovot, Tel Aviv, Ramat Gan, Holon, Ashkelon, and Beer Sheva. 
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crime enables us to test whether terror attacks within a given location have a differential 
effect on the local crime rate versus attacks occurring throughout the rest of the country. 
Differential effects could be expected if police forces are disproportionately increased in 
the area where the attack occurred. This pattern would be exacerbated if the increased 
police force in the area which suffered the attack came at the expense of lowering the 
police presence in unaffected areas. Also, information on the location of each crime and 
terror attack allows us to control for any spurious correlation between the local crime rate 
and the propensity to be attacked by terrorists. For example, it may be the case that 
Jerusalem has a high crime rate and also is a frequent target for terrorists. Our analysis 
controls for the location of the crime, and therefore, neutralizes any spurious correlation 
between local crime rates and the propensity to be attacked.  
We also exploit variation in the "type of location" (street, public building, private 
residence, etc) where each crime was committed. For most types of crime, we distinguish 
between those that were committed in a public space versus those that were committed in 
a private residence. (Public spaces include all places except private residences and yards.) 
For example, a burglary could be committed against a store, which is public, or from a 
private residence. Table 3 breaks down the frequency of each crime by the type of 
location. A few of the crimes are committed primarily in public places (attacking the 
police, robbery, auto-theft, and theft-from-auto), but most other crimes occur in both 
public and private places. After a terror attack, the police routinely increase their 
presence, particularly in the area where the attack occurred and other sensitive targets. 
Our strategy of differentiating between crimes committed in public versus private spaces 
allows us to examine whether the effect of terror on crime is similar across types of   13
crimes and types of locations, shedding light on whether the evidence is consistent with 
an increasing level of police presence on the street as opposed to more people simply 
staying home.  
The third characteristic of each incident of crime that we exploit, the relationship 
between perpetrators and victims, provides another perspective on the causal link 
between terror and crime. Recent studies in the criminological literature have emphasized 
the role of acquaintanceship in certain types of crimes, such as murder (Haynie and 
Armstrong 2006) and rape (Fisher, Cullen et al. 2005; Pazzani 2007). For both types of 
crime, there are important differences separating incidents committed by someone who 
knows the victim and incidents between strangers. Crimes where the victim and 
perpetrator know each other are more likely to be driven by changes in stress levels due 
to terror attacks. A priori, we would expect stress-related crimes between persons 
acquainted with each other to increase as people spend more time together at home.
8  
The data on terror incidents is obtained from two sources: the database of the 
Interdisciplinary Center of Herziliya and the database of Be'etselem, a human rights 
organization in Israel. We include all terror attacks with at least one fatality (not 
including the terrorist) that took place within Israel, excluding the West Bank and Gaza. 
We classify terror incidents into two overlapping levels of severity: all attacks with 1 or 
more deaths; and large attacks with 5 or more deaths. The timing and number killed in 
each of the terror attacks included in our data are shown in Figure 1. 
                                                  
8  However, using this information forces us to restrict the analysis in this case to those crimes where the 
perpetrator is known, since in many cases the perpetrator is unknown until and if the crime is solved.  
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Figure 1 clearly shows large variation in the incidence and severity of daily 
attacks which can be exploited to explain variation in various crime rates over time. 
There are a total of 615 fatalities during the sample period that resulted from 120 separate 
attacks where at least one person was killed. Of these 120 attacks, there were 45 large 
attacks with at least 5 fatalities. These unfortunate events provide a lot more variation to 
exploit than data used by previous studies (i.e. Di Tella and Schargrodsky 2004; Klick 
and Tabarrok 2005). The distribution of fatal terror attacks across the 17 regions along 
with the average number of fatalities per attack is displayed in Table 4. 
   
IV.  The Basic Regression Model 
With data on daily terror incidents and reported offenses for each category of 
crime, the basic empirical strategy is to regress the daily number of offenses for a 
particular type of crime on dummy variables indicating whether a terror attack occurred 
on the same day or on previous days. In addition, we allow for the effect of a terror attack 
on criminal activity to differ between areas that are close to the attack and areas that are 
farther away. We expect all the potential mechanisms described in Section II to be more 
salient in areas closer to the attack, but all of them could be relevant, albeit less so, in 
areas further away from the attack.  For every individual crime category (we suppress the 
subscript for type of crime), the basic regression specification is the following distributed 
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where  it Crime  is the reported number of criminal offenses (for a given category of crime) 
in location i on day t, Li,t-k = 1 if there was a bombing on day t-k in location i and 0 
otherwise, NLi,t-k = 1 if there was a bombing on day t-k in a location other than location i 
(non-local) and 0 otherwise, µit is the fixed-effect for location i during the year and month 
that contains day t, and Zt is a vector of exogenous explanatory variables including 
dummy variables for each day of the week and major holidays
9. The latter variables 
control for potential confounding factors which could arise from the tendency for crime 
and terror attacks to take place on specific days of the week or during holiday seasons. 
After experimenting with the appropriate lag structure, it seemed appropriate to stop with 
five lags.   
The regression specification above includes a fixed-effect for each location and 
month in the sample. That is, the model includes 1071 fixed-effects, one for every 
combination of 17 localities and 63 months (October 2000 through December 2005).
10 To 
the extent that terror attacks are concentrated in certain areas (like Jerusalem and Tel 
Aviv), a spurious correlation between terror attacks and criminal activity could exist if 
these same localities are also different from the rest of the country in terms of their 
criminal activity. Inclusion of a fixed-effect for each locality appears warranted given 
that the most popular targets for terrorists are often the largest and most dense population 
                                                  
9 The standard error estimates of our estimators will tend to be smaller for non-local estimates simply 
because they are based on more information. This point is worthy of noting when assessing the results for 
local and non-local coefficients in the next section.  
10  In certain cases, a fixed-effect for a particular district-month was dropped by the regression if the 
dependent variable was zero for the whole month.  For example, in many cases, there are no murders in a 
given month within a given subdistrict.  Therefore, the total number of potential observations for the 
regressions in Table 6 is 32,606, but this was the actual number of observations for assault, burglary, auto-
theft, theft-from-auto, public disorder, and disrupting the police.  The sample size for the other crimes 
were: 17,189 for murder; 7,203 for murder between acquaintances; 32,547 for aggravated assault; 29,893 
for robbery; 32,056 for trespassing; 24,880 for disturbing the police; 29,443 for rape; 24,753 for rape 
between acquaintances; 32,239 for sexual assault; 27,378 for sexual assault between acquaintances.      16
centers of the country, and because of the general positive relation between larger cities 
and crime (Glaeser and Sacerdote 1999).  
However, the model specification goes much further by including a fixed-effect 
for each month and locality. By doing this, we control not only for differences across 
locations in their levels of crime and terror, but we allow for differences in the trends of 
crime and terror across localities in a very flexible way (a step function for each of the 63 
months within each locality). Over the five-year period studied, one might expect that the 
government adjusted the size and tactics of the local police force to the trend in the local 
level of terror. If true, then a spurious correlation could exist between the local trends in 
criminal activity and terror. Therefore, the overall empirical strategy is to exploit very 
high frequency variation in the data – the effect of terror on crime is identified by seeing 
whether the crime rate is different on days with terror versus days with no terror within a 
given month in a given locality (while controlling for day of the week and holidays). 
Since we are exploiting variation at the daily level, it is often the case that there 
are no crimes on a given day in several locations. That is, there are many cases where the 
dependent variable is zero. Given the "count data" nature of the dependent variable, we 
use a Poisson model to estimate the equation above and our results are presented in terms 
of proportional effects. Tests to evaluate the appropriateness of the Poisson distributional 
assumptions turned out to be generally consistent with the data, and therefore, 
alternatives such as the negative binomial regression are not presented. However, it is 
worth noting that the general pattern of results presented using the Poisson specification 
were found using the negative binomial model and a standard OLS regression with fixed-
effects. Also, although we present only the results with fixed-effects for each location-  17
month-year, qualitatively similar results were obtained using fixed-effects only for 
location (with aggregate time trends included as controls).     
V.   Main Results 
Table 5 presents the main results for all 16 crime categories (13 types of crime 
plus 3 additional variables for crimes between persons acquainted with each other) when 
we test only for a contemporaneous effect of terror attacks that are local and non-local on 
the crime rate on the day of the attack. In addition, our results are presented using two 
alternative ways of defining a terror attack. The first definition includes any attack with at 
least one Israeli civilian fatality ("all attacks"). The second counts only attacks where at 
least five Israeli civilians were killed ("large attacks"), which is just about the mean level 
of fatalities per attack (mean equals 5.2) in our sample.  
We initially estimated each model by allowing for an immediate effect on crime 
on the day of the attack, and allowing for a lagged effect for up to five days after the 
attack. The results of these models are displayed in the Appendix in Tables A1-A4. Table 
6 estimates a more parsimonious model by explaining each daily crime rate with a 
dummy variable for having a local attack on day t or the previous five days, and a dummy 
variable for having a non-local attack on day t or the previous five days. Given our 
primary interest in estimating the direction of the short-term effect of terror on crime 
rather than the specific temporal pattern within this short time window, we confine our   18
discussion of the results to Table 6 which summarizes the effect of having an attack that 
day or during the previous five days.
11  
Public Behavior Crimes 
For crimes related to public behavior, the main result in Table 6 is that a terror 
attack within the last five days increases incidents of trespassing, regardless of whether 
the attack was local or non-local. The coefficient for a local attack is 0.052, which 
implies that any fatal terror attack increases trespassing by an average of 5.3 percent 
(which equals exp(0.052)) for each of the following five days. However, the coefficient is 
not significant, nor are most of the other coefficients for public behavior crimes. The only 
exception is the large and very significant positive effect of non-local terror on 
trespassing. In contrast, large attacks produce significant increases in trespassing 
following both local and non-local terror, although the coefficients are similar in 
magnitude to those obtained for "all attacks." Table 6 shows that crimes like "public 
disorder" or "disturbing the peace" do not respond to terror attacks regardless of whether 
they are large or small. However, incidents of "disrupting the police" increase following 
all types of attacks, but are significant only for large attacks.  
Overall, the results for public disobedience crimes are consistent with a higher 
police presence on the streets after a terror attack. More police officers on the streets will 
naturally lead to more arrests for trespassing, since someone typically needs to catch 
someone in the act in order to make an arrest. Also, a higher level of policing could 
explain the increase in "disrupting the police," since more police on the streets will create 
                                                  
11 Appendix Table A5 performs the same analysis presented in Table 6, but does so at the district level 
(which was done in Table 2 for the analysis on police overtime), rather than the subdistrict level.  The 
results are very similar to Table 6.     19
a larger number of incidents of contact between civilians and police officers. However, 
this result could be due to a higher level of alert by police officers on duty, which 
increases the likelihood that they issue an arrest for a given incident. The lack of any 
effect for "public disorder" or "disturbing the peace" suggests that there is no evidence in 
favor of a large change in the public behavior of normal citizens following an attack. That 
is, there does not seem to be any evidence that an increase in stress levels or social 
solidarity is affecting behaviorally motivated crimes in one direction or the other.  
 
Property crimes 
The strongest response that we find in relation to terror attacks is with property 
crimes, which are also the most prevalent types of crimes. A terror attack in the last five 
days has a large and negative effect on burglaries, auto-thefts, and "thefts-from-autos." 
The estimates imply that a local attack reduces the burglary rate by 6.5 percent for each 
of the five days following an attack (approximately 9.96 burglaries relative to a mean of 
153.27, which is almost of third of a standard deviation of 34.99 in Table 3). The 
magnitude of the effect is similar for thefts-from-autos (5.8 percent reduction), which is 
about 9.75 offenses relative to a mean of 168.14, which is also almost a third of a 
standard deviation of 32.84 in Table 3.  However, the estimated coefficient is 
considerably higher for auto-thefts – a 12.6 percent reduction in auto-thefts for each of 
the five days after any terror attack.  The estimated magnitude is about 10.16 auto-thefts 
relative to the mean of 80.66, which is more than half of a standard deviation of 18.23.   20
Overall, the results for these three property crimes are significant for both local 
attacks and non-local attacks, and whether we look at all attacks or "large attacks". 
However, two clear patterns emerge for property crimes. First, the effect of a local attack 
is much larger than the effect for non-local attacks. For example, the coefficient for a 
local attack is 3 times larger than a non-local attack for burglaries, 6 times larger for auto-
thefts, and 3-4 times larger for thefts-from-autos. This pattern highlights the need to 
distinguish between local and non-local attacks. The second pattern evident in Table 6 is 
that larger attacks yield larger responses in crime, particularly for local attacks. This is 
true for all property crimes – the coefficient for "a large attack" is bigger than "any 
attack" by a factor of 1/3 for burglaries, 2 for auto-thefts, and 1/3 for thefts-from-autos.
12 
Finally, although the effect of a local attack seems to increase with the size of the attack, 
this pattern is not as evident for non-local attacks.  
Once again, these findings are consistent with an increasing deterrence effect of a 
larger police presence after a terror attack. It is reasonable to expect not only a larger 
general police deployment after a terror attack, but also that the forces will be 
disproportionately placed in areas that suffered the attack (as shown in Table 2). Also, 
Table 2 indicates that the police response increases with the size of the attack. These 
patterns can explain the results displayed in Table 6 -- larger reductions in crime in the 
area where the attack occurred and larger effects after larger attacks.
13   
                                                  
12  In results that are not presented, we found that the reduction in auto-thefts and thefts-from-autos is 
sharper as the number of casualties in the last five days increases.  The number of casualties was not 
significant for other types of crime. 
13  The decline in auto thefts could be partially due to the Israeli army closing the border to the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip after a terror attack, but the results are robust to including measures for closures into the 
regression.     21
In contrast to the other property crimes, robbery does not seem to respond in any 
systematic way after a terror attack. However, it is important to note that burglary, auto-
theft, and thefts-from-autos are among the most prevalent categories of crime. Burglaries 
are 25 times more common than robberies, and theft-from-autos is even more prevalent 
than burglaries. As the fourth most common type of crime, auto-thefts are also very 
influential on the overall crime rate. Therefore, the results in Table 6 indicate that the 
overall property crime rate declines significantly after a terror attack.   
 
Sex Crimes 
Table 6 shows that terror does not have any systematic effect on sex crimes.  The 
coefficient for a local attack on rape is significant and quite large – suggesting an 
increase of 17 percent in the five days after a local attack. However, in contrast to the 
patterns for property crimes, the effect is much smaller and insignificant for large attacks 
and is not significant at all for non-local attacks. The lack of any systematic pattern in 
relation to the size of the attack makes us particularly reticent to place much value on this 
coefficient. In addition, after examining the coefficients for each of the five days after an 
attack (Table A3), the significant positive coefficient in Table 6 is seen to mask a 
complex pattern where there is a dramatic decrease in rapes the day after an attack (a 60 
percent decline), and then there is a sharp increase on day 3 and day 4 after an attack 
(50.3 percent and 44.6 percent respectively). Since rape is unlikely to be affected by the 
local police presence, this "down-and-up" pattern could be due to an initial increase in 
social solidarity followed by increasing stress levels.  However, we find no such pattern 
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for sexual assaults.  In fact, large attacks are shown in Table 6 to decrease sexual assaults 
in the next five days. These conflicting results for similar types of crimes cast doubt on 
whether the results for rape are driven by a few random outliers – a realistic concern 
given that rapes are relatively rare and only one-third as frequent as sexual assaults (see 
Table 3). Therefore, the lack of significant results for most of the sexual crimes, 
combined with an inconsistent pattern for the few coefficients that are significant, lead us 




Table 6 presents results for three types of violent crimes: murder, assault, and 
aggravated assault. The large increase in murders following an attack draws particular 
attention, but this result is most likely spurious. Although the Israeli Police report that 
deaths from terror attacks are not supposed to be included in the murder category, the 
evidence suggests that in most cases fatal terror attacks were recorded as a murder of one 
person. (The mean number of murders on days without a terror attack is 0.027, while the 
mean number of murders on days with terror is 0.842). Further evidence that the large 
murder effect is due to data misclassification is that the effect of terror on murder is 
entirely contemporaneous, with no systematic pattern in the days following the terror 
attack (see Table A4). Table 6 also shows an increase in murders when the attack is non-
local, which is somewhat believable since a terror attack occurring in locality j may be 
recorded as a murder in locality j, but not in locality i. Given that a large proportion of   23
murders in Israel are mob-related, the mafia might conceivably use the confusion induced 
by a terror attack as an opportunity to settle scores. However, we tend to discount the 
murder results due to the obvious classification error problems.    
Another cause for skepticism regarding the increase in murders is that there are no 
similar increases in other violent crimes like assaults and aggravated assaults. If increased 
social stress were driving the murder results, a general increase in other forms of violent 
crime should be discernible. However, Table 6 shows a significant decline of 13.2 
percent in aggravated assaults for five days following any local attack. This reduction is 
larger, 17.8 percent, for larger local attacks. That is, the results for aggravated assault 
show a similar pattern exhibited by property crime: a larger decline in response to local 
attacks versus non-local attacks, and a stronger response to larger attacks. Similar to the 
decline in property crime, the decline in violent crime is likely a result of an increasing 
cost of crime. However, in the case of violent crime, the increase in costs is likely driven 
by the shift in leisure activities as much as it is by increased policing. Of course, the 
decline in violent crimes may conceivably be driven by behavioral responses, such as an 
increasing sense of social solidarity after an attack, but this argument looks less likely 
following the analysis presented in the next section. 
  
VI.  Extensions of the Main Results 
Does Familiarity Matter?  
As already noted, the data contain information on the relationship between the 
victim and the perpetrator (when it is known). Crimes committed between individuals   24
who previously knew each other are more likely to be influenced by personal tensions 
between the two parties than an incident between two strangers. Therefore, we expect 
that the existence of a strong behaviorally motivated response in crime to be identifiable 
by focusing on crimes between acquaintances. In Table 6, we show additional results for 
murder, rape, and sexual assault – but only for incidents that occur between 
acquaintances. The results for each of the five days after an attack are shown in the 
Appendix Tables. 
Although we found a few significant results for the overall categories of rape and 
sexual assault, the results are generally weaker when we look only at those committed 
between acquaintances. We do find strong effects once again for murder between 
acquaintances, but this result remains suspect for reasons stated earlier.
14 Overall, the 
results provide no support for the idea that terror induces an increase or decrease in 
tensions between friends, spouses, and acquaintances.   
 
Does the Type of Location Matter? 
A central feature in our data is the ability to distinguish between crimes 
committed in public places and crimes committed in private residences. Distinguishing 
crimes by the type of location in which they occur offers further insight into the relevance 
of possible mechanisms behind our findings. For example, a heavier police presence is 
likely to raise the costs of crimes committed in public more than it raises the costs of 
                                                  
14 We hoped that we could extract from the problem of coding terror attacks as murders by looking only at 
murders between acquaintances.  However, we obtained similarly suspicious results, most likely because a 
few terror incidents did involve a terrorist who knew his victim (a worker and his employer).    25
crimes committed in private homes, while crimes committed at home are more likely 
influenced by the increased time spent at home because people go out less to restaurants 
and other leisure activities after terror attacks. 
Tables 7 presents the effect of any terror attack on each type of crime after 
dividing each category of crime into those committed in "public" versus those committed 
in private residences ("at home"). The positive effects of a terror attack on trespassing 
and “disrupting the police” are notably more pronounced in public places versus private 
residences. That is, the generally positive effects shown in Table 6 for both crimes appear 
driven by the effect of terror on the crimes committed in public places. This result is 
consistent with the interpretation that a higher police presence following an attack is 
leading to higher rates of arrest and generally more incidents of contact between civilians 
and police officers.   
The results for property crime are generally stronger for those committed at home 
versus in public places, although significant effects are found in both types of locations. 
The estimates for local attacks on burglaries and auto-thefts are much stronger in private 
homes versus public places, emphasizing the argument that the shift in leisure activities is 
playing a role in increasing the costs of crime. However, local attacks are still highly 
significant for auto-thefts in public, and non-local attacks are significant for burglaries 
and auto-thefts in public. In fact, non-local attacks actually have larger effects on 
burglaries and auto-thefts in public places versus private homes. The results for theft-
from-autos are much more significant in public places versus private homes for both local 
and non-local attacks. The coefficient magnitudes are higher for private places, but they 
are not significant.   26
Overall, the significant effects for property crimes committed in public places is 
once again evidence in favor of the deterrence effect of an increased police presence. The 
fact that the effects are larger in magnitude for burglaries and auto-thefts in private homes 
is consistent with a larger police presence, but also supports the notion that there is a 
deterrent effect on crime when people shift their leisure time towards home-based 
activities.  
The results do not show systematic effects of terror on sexual crimes committed 
in public or private places. However, there are interesting distinctions for violent crimes 
in Table 7. Specifications in Table 6, which did not distinguish between crimes in public 
versus private, yielded insignificant results for assaults. After making the public-private 
distinction in Table 7, the results now show significant reductions in assaults in private 
places. These findings suggest that terror might also raise the costs of violent crimes by 
keeping people and their family and friends nearby. While increasing time at home could 
potentially aggravate crimes such as domestic disturbances, there is no evidence to 
suggest that this is occurring.  
Finally, Table 8 presents a similar breakdown of each crime into public and 
private, but considers only "large attacks" as incidents of terror. Overall, the results are 
similar to those obtained in Table 7, which looked at all terror attacks. However, the 
results tend to be larger when we look at larger attacks, although the standard errors also 
appear larger so the significance is sometimes lower. 
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Distinguishing Between Nearby and Far Away Attacks 
So far, we have distinguished only between local and non-local attacks in our 
regression specifications. Here, we investigate the spatial dimension of the effect of terror 
in more detail by dividing non-local attacks into two categories: those that occur nearby 
in an adjacent subdistrict and those that occur farther away in a non-adjacent subdistrict. 
The effect of terror could differ if police officers and other resources are shifted from 
nearby areas into the area where the attack occurred – thus affecting the costs of crime 
differentially across space according to the proximity of the attack.  However, the results 
in Table 9 suggest that the effect of non-local attacks are either similar (trespassing and 
burglary) or get weaker (auto theft and theft from autos) with distance from the attack.  
This pattern is not consistent with resources being shifted to nearby areas that are 
attacked, which would have caused a relative increase in crime in contiguous areas versus 
areas further away.  Overall, the pattern of results is quite similar for non-local attacks in 
adjacent subdistricts versus those in subdistricts further away. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
Using a unique panel data set on the daily criminal and terrorist activity in 17 
districts in Israel from October 2000 through 2005, this is the first paper to analyze the 
effect of an extended wave of terror on various categories of criminal activity.  After 
controlling for the fixed-effect of each district and for district-specific time trends, our 
results show that terror reduces property crimes such as burglary, auto-theft, and thefts-  28
from-cars. It should be noted that burglary and thefts-from-cars are the two most common 
types of crime, and auto-theft is the fourth most common (assault is number three).   
We also find that terror attacks reduce incidents of assaults and aggravated 
assaults that occur in private homes. In contrast, terror attacks increase crimes committed 
in public spaces such as trespassing and disrupting the police. Generally speaking, the 
estimated effects for all crime categories increase with the size of the terror attack, and 
local attacks have a larger effect on local crime rates than non-local attacks.  
Overall, the pattern of results appears to be driven by the increased costs 
associated with criminal activity following terror attacks. An increased police presence 
following terror attacks is consistent with a stronger deterrence effect for property crimes 
(burglary, auto-theft, and theft-from-autos)
 15, while at the same time increasing incidents 
of trespassing and "disrupting the police." The latter effect could be considered an 
expected outcome when more police are on the streets, since more trespassing and 
disruptions of police work are expected when the police are increasing their surveillance 
operations. Indeed, our analysis shows that the police increase their presence more in the 
area where a terror attack occurs versus other areas, and that the response increases with 
the size of the attack. This behavior by the police is consistent with our findings that the 
effects of terror on crime are larger in the area of the attack, and even more so when the 
attack causes more fatalities.   
                                                  
15 One possible confounding factor could the that the Israeli Defense Force often erects barriers and 
institutes closures on the West Bank and Gaza Strip after a terror attack, and the closure typically lasts at 
least a few days.  However, in results not presented, we tested this hypothesis by including dummy 
variables for days when a closure was in progress, and the results turned out to be very similar. 
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However, the costs of crime may also increase after an attack due to shifts in 
leisure activities – an increased tendency to stay at home after an attack. While increased 
policing may be able to explain some of the decrease in property crime in private homes, 
it is also likely that there is increased deterrence when more people are staying at home. 
That is, the increased presence of family and friends in their own homes and nearby 
houses offers an effective additional layer of security against criminals. Similarly, the 
decline in violent crimes, primarily in private spaces, may be influenced by the fact that 
family members and friends are providing additional support and security at home.  Since 
we do not find a significant increase in police presence in response to non-local attacks, it 
is possible that the significant effect of non-local attacks on certain crime rates may be 
due entirely to the increasing costs of crime resulting from a shift in leisure activities.   
Our results reject the hypothesis that terror increases the propensity to commit 
crime by increasing social tensions. In addition, the evidence is inconsistent with the idea 
that terror lowers the cost of crime by taking away police resources from crime-fighting 
activities.
16 Although increased social cohesion could explain the observed reduction in 
crimes, it seems likely that this factor plays a limited role. An increase in social solidarity 
clearly cannot explain an increase in public crimes such as trespassing and disrupting the 
police. Given our expectation that social cohesion will have a stronger impact on violent 
                                                  
16  A possible explanation for our results could be that terror attacks make individuals less likely to report 
criminal activity to the police.  We believe the evidence is not consistent with this explanation for several 
reasons.  First, it should be noted that the date of each crime in our data set is not the date that it was 
reported, rather, the day the crime was committed.  So, if people delay reporting the crime for a day or two, 
this would not affect the results.  Second, although people may try to avoid calling the police on the day of 
a terror attack to report a crime, it seems unlikely that this could explain the decline in crime for up to five 
days after an attack.  Third, the tendency to under-report in reaction to terror should be stronger for less 
serious types of crime, since individuals should be more likely to report serious crimes regardless of 
whether there was an attack or not.  But, we do not see a decline in small crimes like "disturbing the peace" 
which we would expect people to under-report on days of an attack, and we do not see a larger decline in 
"assaults" versus the more serious "aggravated assaults" in private homes.   30
and sexual crimes relative to crimes with an economic motive, rising social solidarity is 
not likely to be a factor in the large reduction in property crimes. In fact, the only real 
question is whether increasing social solidarity can explain the decline in violent crimes. 
For this effect to be convincingly demonstrated, it would need to be reflected in a decline 
in similar crimes in public spaces – places where the social interaction of strangers might 
be modified by increasing solidarity. However, assaults in public places actually show a 
slight increase after an attack. The entire decline in violent crime is limited to private 
residences, thus providing little support for the social solidarity effect. 
Overall, our results are consistent with those in Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004), 
Klick and Tabarrok (2005), and Draca, Machin, and Witt (2008) in the sense that we also 
show that terror leads to a significant reduction in crime. However, our analysis exploits a 
much larger number of terror attacks, and examines a larger set of crime categories.  In 
addition, our results differ from Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004) in that we show a 
general decline in property crime throughout the country in response to a terror attack, 
while they show a decline in auto thefts in Argentina only around areas which were 
regarded as potential targets, and therefore, received extra police protection. This 
difference in results is likely due to the limited way that police forces were bolstered only 
around Jewish areas in Argentina, while in Israel, policing had to be increased more 
widely because everyone was a potential target and the socio-behavioral impact would 
also be expected to affect the population more widely than in Argentina.  
As a result, our analysis suggests that increasing the costs of crime on a wide 
scale, through increased police presence on the street as well a shift in the day-to-day 
activities of people, can have a substantial impact on some of the most common types of   31
crime.  Terrorists appear to increase the costs of crime in both of these dimensions, and 
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Figure 1: Daily Count of Fatalities from Terror in Israel 
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Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics of the Police Overtime Data by Week, 2000-2005 
  Mean   Std. 
 





Age  36.03   8.57 
Education  13.54   1.83 
Male  0.84  0.36 
Any Terror Local Attack (≥1 Fatality) during the Week  0.06  0.23 
Large Terror Local Attack (≥5 Fatalities) during the Week  0.02  0.14 
Very Large Local Terror Attack (≥10 Fatalities) during the Week  0.01  0.11 
 
Number of Observations 
 
1073 
Notes: The sample consists of individuals currently working as police officers in Israel from the 
Israel Labor Force Surveys from 2000-2005.  
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Probit on Working Overtime During the Week 
  
Local Attack 
(≥1 Fatality)  0.0649**    -0.00761  -0.00926 
  (0.025)    (0.036)  (0.040) 
Non-Local 
Attack 
(≥1 Fatality)  0.00133      0.00163 
  (0.014)      (0.018) 
Local Attack 
(≥5 Fatalities)   0.202*      
   (0.11)      
Non-Local 
Attack 
(≥5 Fatalities)   -0.0115      
   (0.029)      
Local Attack 
(≥10 Fatalities)     0.235**    
     (0.12)    
Non-Local 
Attack 
(≥10 Fatalities)     -0.0113    
     (0.021)    
Number of 
Local Fatalities      0.0102*  0.0102* 
      (0.0056)  (0.0057) 
Number of 
Non-Local 
Fatalities       0.000284 
       (0.0016) 
Observations  1073 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at 1%; ** indicates 
significance at 5%; and * indicates significance at 10%.  All regressions include a fixed-
effect for each of the six districts in Israel (Jerusalem, Northern, Haifa, Central, Tel Aviv, 
and Southern districts), dummies for each year from 2001-2005, years of schooling, 
age, age squared, sex, and number of kids in the following ranges: 0-1, 2-4, 5-9, 10-14, 
and 15-17.  Local attacks are those occurring in the respondent’s district, and non-local 
attacks are those outside of the respondent’s district. Standard errors are clustered at 
the district level.    37
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics on Incidents of Crime, Israel 2000-2005  
 All  Locations   No Terror 
Past 5 days  
Terror Past 

















Daily Mean  
 
 
Daily Mean  
 
Trespassing 46.17  22.54  45.87  46.88  2.30  43.88  
 
Public Disorder 36.07  17.39  36.09  36.02  17.95  18.12  
 
Attack Police 16.06  5.20  16.14  15.88  1.38  14.68  
 
Disturb Police 2.79  2.14  2.72  2.95  1.43  1.35  
 
Burglary 153.27  34.99  155.28  148.53  95.26  58.00  
 
Robbery 6.03  2.78  6.12  5.82  0.86  5.17  
 
Auto Theft 80.66  18.23  82.42  76.52  4.04  76.62  
 
Theft from Auto 168.14  32.84  168.72  166.76  1.09  167.05  
 
Rape 2.06  2.59  2.08  2.02  1.27  0.79  
 
Rape Acquainted 1.10  1.67  1.11  1.08  0.87  0.23  
 




1.98  3.50  1.97  1.99  1.15  0.83  
 
Murder 0.50  0.72  0.44  0.66  0.15  0.35  
 
Murder Acquainted 0.15  0.39  0.14  0.19  0.08  0.08  
 
Assault 113.33  24.78  112.64  114.98  53.06  60.27  
 
Aggravated Assault  8.44  3.46  8.52  8.26  4.22  4.22  
   38
Table 4: Terror attacks by subdistrict 
Subdistrict Number of 
Fatal Attacks  
  Average 
Fatalities per 
Attack  
Jerusalem 41     5.2  
Zefat 1     9.0  
Kineret 0     0.0  
Afula 11     3.8  
Acco 3     3.3  
Nazareth 1     1.0  
Haifa 6     12.8  
Hadera   12     4.0  
Sharon 11     5.2  
Petach Tiqwa 10     1.6  
Ramle 0     0.0  
Rehovot 3     8.7  
Tel Aviv 13     6.2  
Ramat Gan 1     1.0  
Holon 0      0.0  
Ashqelon 4     3.0  
Beer Sheva 3     6.7  
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Local Attack  0.150** 0.0553 0.160* 0.0763    0.0730 0.0536  0.166  0.0132 
   (0.060) (0.075) (0.083)  (0.20)    (0.069) (0.16)  (0.11)  (0.43) 
Non-Local 
Attack  0.0949*** 0.0387  0.0339  0.115* 
 
0.127*** 0.0228  0.0322  0.224** 
   (0.023) (0.024) (0.032) (0.068)    (0.037) (0.034) (0.042)  (0.10) 
  
Burglary Robbery  Auto  Theft  Theft from 
Auto 
 
Burglary Robbery  Auto  Theft  Theft from 
Auto 
Local Attack  -0.0812*** -0.0626  -0.143*** -0.0620*    -0.180*** 0.138 -0.339***  -0.0530 
   (0.030) (0.15) (0.049)  (0.036)    (0.052) (0.26) (0.083)  (0.041) 
Non-Local 
Attack  -0.0178* -0.0157 -0.0116 -0.0157* 
 
0.00363 -0.0101  -0.0378**  -0.0200 
   (0.011) (0.045) (0.012)  (0.0095)    (0.014) (0.063) (0.019) (0.013) 
  











Local Attack  0.155 0.123 -0.130  -0.0315    0.447 0.365 -0.171  -0.478 
   (0.25) (0.34) (0.21) (0.30)    (0.34) (0.40) (0.24) (1.98) 
Non-Local 
Attack  0.0817 0.109 0.0779*  0.146* 
 
0.0905 0.111 0.146* 0.106 
   (0.070) (0.10) (0.043)  (0.079)    (0.11) (0.16)  (0.089)  (0.15) 
  
Murder  Murder 
Acq.  Assault  Aggravated 
Assault 
 
Murder  Murder Acq.  Assault  Aggravated 
Assault 
Local Attack  3.383*** 3.436*** -0.0241  -0.111    3.186*** 3.616*** -0.0488  -0.177 
   (0.097) (0.30) (0.039) (0.15)    (0.16) (0.41) (0.10) (0.21) 
Non-Local 
Attack  0.287*** 0.115  0.0152  -0.0670* 
 
0.0832 0.116 -0.0131  -0.0573 
   (0.10) (0.20)  (0.011)  (0.039)    (0.25) (0.36)  (0.016)  (0.064) 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at 1%; ** indicates significance at 5%; and * indicates significance at 10%.  
Each coefficient comes from a Poisson regression which includes a fixed-effect for each subdistrict-year-month, dummy variables for day of the 
week, and a dummy variable for holidays.  "All attacks" consider any attack with at least one fatality as a terror attack, while "large attacks" 
consider only attacks with at least five casualties. Standard errors are clustered by level of the fixed-effect.    40
  
Table 6: Effect of Terror in the Last 5 Days on Crime by Size of Attack, Israel 2000-2005 
 

















Local Attack  0.0519 -0.00878 0.0766 0.00324    0.0743* -0.0274 0.0668* -0.0964 
   (0.036) (0.032) (0.049) (0.090)    (0.044) (0.043) (0.036)  (0.18) 
Non-Local 
Attack  0.0785*** -0.00630  0.0192  0.0112 
 
0.0612** 0.0162 0.0448** 0.0271 
   (0.019) (0.014) (0.018) (0.033)    (0.025) (0.015) (0.022) (0.044) 
  
Burglary Robbery  Auto  Theft  Theft from 
Auto 
 
Burglary Robbery  Auto  Theft  Theft from 
Auto 
Local Attack  -0.0675*** 0.000817  -0.135*** -0.0599***    -0.0927** 0.118 -0.275***  -0.0832** 
   (0.018) (0.079) (0.023) (0.020)    (0.039) (0.12) (0.035)  (0.037) 
Non-Local 
Attack  -0.0270*** 0.0117 -0.0280***  -0.0162** 
 
-0.0271*** -0.00192 -0.0337*** -0.0192* 
   (0.0067) (0.023) (0.0076)  (0.0070)    (0.0083)  (0.031) (0.011) (0.012) 
  











Local Attack  0.176** 0.120  -0.102 0.0393    0.0949 0.0229 -0.236* -0.208 
   (0.081) (0.14) (0.066) (0.14)    (0.13) (0.23) (0.13) (0.20) 
Non-Local 
Attack  -0.0348 -0.0394 0.0170  -0.000484 
 
-0.0705 -0.0699 0.0157 -0.0426 
   (0.040) (0.059) (0.027) (0.055)    (0.050) (0.081) (0.041) (0.067) 
  
Murder  Murder 
Acq.  Assault  Aggravated 
Assault 
 
Murder  Murder Acq.  Assault  Aggravated 
Assault 
Local Attack  1.661*** 1.685*** -0.0235 -0.142**    1.574*** 2.249*** -0.0126  -0.196* 
   (0.11) (0.21)  (0.018)  (0.072)    (0.17) (0.40)  (0.028)  (0.10) 
Non-Local 
Attack  0.0148 -0.160  0.00375  -0.0184 
 
0.0562 0.134  -0.00585  -0.0311 
   (0.082) (0.16)  (0.0057)  (0.021)    (0.11) (0.15)  (0.0087)  (0.030) 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at 1%; ** indicates significance at 5%; and * indicates significance at 10%.  
Each coefficient comes from a Poisson regression which includes a fixed-effect for each subdistrict-year-month, dummy variables for day of the 
week, and a dummy variable for holidays.  "All attacks" consider any attack with at least one fatality as a terror attack, while "large attacks" 
consider only attacks with at least five casualties. Standard errors are clustered by level of the fixed-effect.  
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Local Attack  -0.110 -0.0113  -0.0795 0.103    0.0575* -0.00614 0.0852** -0.0869 
   (0.10) (0.048) (0.13)  (0.13)    (0.033) (0.039) (0.036)  (0.13) 
Non-Local 
Attack  0.0740 0.00232 0.0426  -0.000119 
 
0.0789*** -0.0157  0.0169  0.0251 
   (0.051) (0.017) (0.054) (0.053)    (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.062) 
  
Burglary Robbery  Auto  Theft  Theft from 
Auto 
 
Burglary Robbery  Auto  Theft  Theft from 
Auto 
Local Attack  -0.0882*** 0.0912  -0.361***  -0.113   -0.0346 -0.0139  -0.126***  -0.0596*** 
   (0.021) (0.16) (0.089) (0.25)    (0.028) (0.073) (0.021) (0.021) 
Non-Local 
Attack  -0.0206*** -0.0188  -0.0134  -0.0349 
 
-0.0400*** 0.0170 -0.0288***  -0.0161** 
   (0.0079) (0.048)  (0.033)  (0.060)    (0.010) (0.026)  (0.0090)  (0.0073) 
  











Local Attack  0.161 0.113 -0.202  -0.0493    0.197 0.149  -0.0598  0.134 
   (0.13) (0.17) (0.14) (0.15)    (0.17) (0.24)  (0.090)  (0.17) 
Non-Local 
Attack  -0.0789 -0.0874* 0.00122 -0.0148 
 
0.0351 0.130 0.0256  0.0199 
   (0.060) (0.053) (0.042) (0.068)    (0.066) (0.13) (0.029)  (0.060) 
  
Murder  Murder 
Acq.  Assault  Aggravated 
Assault 
 
Murder  Murder Acq.  Assault  Aggravated 
Assault 
Local Attack  0.283 0.950**  -0.0564**  -0.254**    2.029*** 2.017*** 0.00408 -0.0502 
   (0.29) (0.47)  (0.024)  (0.099)    (0.15) (0.34)  (0.020)  (0.079) 
Non-Local 
Attack  -0.0591 0.0277  -0.00860  -0.0305 
 
0.0610 -0.354 0.0148*  -0.00599 
   (0.16) (0.20)  (0.011)  (0.024)    (0.088) (0.23)  (0.0085)  (0.031) 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at 1%; ** indicates significance at 5%; and * indicates significance at 10%.  
Each coefficient comes from a Poisson regression which includes a fixed-effect for each subdistrict-year-month, dummy variables for day of the 
week, and a dummy variable for holidays.  "All attacks" consider any attack with at least one fatality as a terror attack, while "large attacks" 
consider only attacks with at least five casualties. Standard errors are clustered by level of the fixed-effect.   42



















Local Attack  0.0389 -0.0491 -0.244  -0.144    0.0752 -0.00746 0.0839  -0.0727 
   (0.17) (0.084) (0.21)  (0.35)    (0.065) (0.062) (0.056)  (0.15) 
Non-Local 
Attack  0.122* 0.0117 0.112 -0.0224 
 
0.0573***  0.0208 0.0382 0.0830 
   (0.072) (0.024) (0.082) (0.069)    (0.022) (0.020) (0.028) (0.069) 
  
Burglary Robbery  Auto  Theft  Theft from 
Auto 
 
Burglary Robbery  Auto  Theft  Theft from 
Auto 
Local Attack  -0.0843** 0.0927 -0.663*** -0.567    -0.106*** 0.122 -0.262***  -0.0805** 
   (0.043) (0.26)  (0.22)  (0.43)    (0.031) (0.13) (0.031)  (0.034) 
Non-Local 
Attack  -0.0227* -0.0452 -0.00876 -0.0440 
 
-0.0344*** 0.00483 -0.0351*** -0.0191* 
   (0.012) (0.084) (0.046)  (0.10)    (0.013) (0.038) (0.011) (0.010) 
  











Local Attack  0.175 0.0156 -0.452 -0.354    -0.0106 0.0376  -0.145 -0.0467 
   (0.22) (0.24) (0.29) (0.29)    (0.27) (0.42) (0.12) (0.23) 
Non-Local 
Attack  -0.107 -0.149  -0.0457  0.00274 
 
-0.0145 0.206 0.0475 -0.105 
   (0.076) (0.094) (0.065) (0.087)    (0.089) (0.16) (0.042)  (0.086) 
  
Murder  Murder 
Acq.  Assault  Aggravated 
Assault 
 
Murder  Murder Acq.  Assault  Aggravated 
Assault 
Local Attack  0.885* 2.558  -0.0937*  -0.175    1.736*** 2.199***  0.0531  -0.213 
   (0.49)  (8.52) (0.051) (0.16)    (0.20) (0.50)  (0.039)  (0.15) 
Non-Local 
Attack  -0.0253 0.0803 -0.0176 -0.0553 
 
0.0947 0.175  0.00460  -0.00644 
   (0.20) (0.29)  (0.013)  (0.036)    (0.11) (0.22)  (0.013)  (0.029) 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at 1%; ** indicates significance at 5%; and * indicates significance at 10%.  
Each coefficient comes from a Poisson regression which includes a fixed-effect for each subdistrict-year-month, dummy variables for day of the 
week, and a dummy variable for holidays.  "All attacks" consider any attack with at least one fatality as a terror attack, while "large attacks" 
consider only attacks with at least five casualties. Standard errors are clustered by level of the fixed-effect.   43
Table 9: Effect of any Terror Attack in the Last 5 Days on Crime in Adjacent and Non-Adjacent Sub-districts   
  







Burglary  Robbery  Auto Theft  Theft from 
Auto 
Local Attack  0.0517** -0.00850  0.0764  0.00217    -0.0677*** 0.00209  -0.136*** -0.0601*** 
   (0.025) (0.030) (0.050) (0.090)    (0.017) (0.051) (0.018) (0.022) 
 
Attack in 
Adjacent   0.0792*** 0.00981 -0.000396 -0.0170 
 
-0.0281*** 0.0724* -0.0560***  -0.0309*** 
Subdistrict  (0.027) (0.024) (0.027) (0.059)    (0.011) (0.041) (0.013) (0.011) 
 
Attack in Non-
Adjacent   0.0604*** -0.00938  0.0154  0.0509 
 
-0.0258*** -0.00533 -0.0223**  -0.00588 
 Subdistrict  (0.018) (0.013) (0.020) (0.044)    (0.0067) (0.025)  (0.010) (0.0088) 
  
Murder  Murder 
Acq.  Assault  Aggravated 
Assault 
 





Local Attack  1.660*** 1.692*** -0.0235  -0.142    0.176** 0.120  -0.103 0.0392 
   (0.12) (0.21)  (0.015)  (0.087)    (0.088) (0.11) (0.084) (0.14) 
Attack in 
Adjacent   0.00912 0.119 0.00101  -0.0284 
 
-0.0501 0.0528 -0.0182 -0.0521 
Subdistrict  (0.17) (0.36)  (0.012)  (0.036)    (0.060) (0.083) (0.048) (0.097) 
 
Attack in Non-
Adjacent   -0.0356 -0.262* 0.00493 -0.0173 
 
-0.0234 -0.0534 0.0275  0.0428 
 Subdistrict  (0.084) (0.16)  (0.0067)  (0.019)    (0.046) (0.057) (0.028) (0.052) 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at 1%; ** indicates significance at 5%; and * indicates significance at 10%.  
Each coefficient comes from a Poisson regression which includes a fixed-effect for each subdistrict-year-month, dummy variables for day of the 
week, and a dummy variable for holidays.  "All attacks" consider any attack with at least one fatality as a terror attack, while "large attacks" 
consider only attacks with at least five casualties. Standard errors are clustered by level of the fixed-effect.  
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0 Days Local  0.156*** 0.0506 0.164*** 0.0678    0.0821 0.0457 0.170*  -0.000354 
   (0.056) (0.083) (0.056)  (0.23)    (0.082) (0.15) (0.097) (0.44) 
1 Day Local  0.114 -0.0108  0.0122 -0.119    0.205** 0.0291 0.0900 0.0267 
   (0.083) (0.071) (0.079)  (0.21)    (0.10) (0.17) (0.11) (0.25) 
2 Days Local  0.108* -0.00507 0.0419  -0.283    0.141 -0.123*  -0.0670  -0.0961 
   (0.061) (0.075) (0.078)  (0.20)    (0.13) (0.071) (0.12)  (0.42) 
3 Days Local  0.0127 0.0257 0.142** 0.209    0.0358 -0.0327  0.179  0.309 
   (0.097) (0.068) (0.063)  (0.20)    (0.14) (0.11) (0.12) (0.40) 
4 Days Local  0.0252 -0.0675 0.0669 0.0832    0.111 -0.0159  0.0315  -0.0961 
   (0.062) (0.057) (0.069)  (0.19)    (0.078)  (0.11) (0.13) (0.45) 
5 Days Local  -0.107** -0.000797 -0.0268  -0.0120   -0.0659 -0.0559  -0.125  -0.830 
   (0.049) (0.059) (0.077)  (0.17)    (0.085) (0.090)  (0.15)  (2.68) 
0 Days Non-Local  0.0993*** 0.0360*  0.0353  0.110**    0.129*** 0.0224  0.0367 0.217** 
   (0.021) (0.020) (0.024) (0.049)    (0.038) (0.036) (0.038) (0.100) 
1 Day Non-Local  0.0964*** 0.00735  0.0455*  0.0107   0.0995*** 0.0509  0.107**  0.0639 
   (0.021) (0.017) (0.027) (0.058)    (0.036) (0.032) (0.043)  (0.10) 
2 Days Non-Local  0.0144 -0.0354  -0.00747  0.0205    -0.0126 -0.0559* 0.0144  -0.100 
   (0.024) (0.022) (0.031) (0.073)    (0.042) (0.032) (0.040) (0.098) 
3 Days Non-Local  0.0501* 0.0455* 0.00182 0.0218    0.0807* 0.0347 0.00633  0.00869 
   (0.030) (0.025) (0.029) (0.055)    (0.048) (0.037) (0.055)  (0.11) 
4 Days Non-Local  0.0413**  -0.0105 -0.0171 -0.0552    0.0341 0.0117 0.0436  -0.265*** 
   (0.020) (0.019) (0.027) (0.075)    (0.048) (0.031) (0.041) (0.094) 
5 Days Non-Local  -0.00332 0.0203  0.0237  -0.0209    0.0116 0.00841 0.0528  0.0291 
   (0.021) (0.021) (0.033) (0.067)    (0.032) (0.029) (0.038) (0.087) 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at 1%; ** indicates significance at 5%; and * indicates significance at 10%.  
Each coefficient comes from a Poisson regression which includes a fixed-effect for each subdistrict-year-month, dummy variables for day of the 
week, and a dummy variable for holidays.  "All attacks" consider any attack with at least one fatality as a terror attack, while "large attacks" 
consider only attacks with at least five casualties. Standard errors are clustered by level of the fixed-effect.  
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Burglary  Robbery  Auto Theft  Theft from 
Auto 
 
Burglary  Robbery  Auto Theft  Theft from 
Auto 
0 Days Local  -0.0886*** -0.0623  -0.161*** -0.0705**    -0.188*** 0.148 -0.371***  -0.0648 
   (0.033) (0.16) (0.048)  (0.031)    (0.052) (0.20) (0.100)  (0.054) 
1 Day Local  -0.0632* 0.189 -0.140***  -0.0467    -0.0927 0.445*  -0.277***  -0.0518 
   (0.034) (0.17) (0.044)  (0.037)    (0.067) (0.25) (0.078)  (0.070) 
2 Days Local  -0.0202 0.117  -0.148***  -0.0612    0.0170 0.190  -0.301***  -0.136** 
   (0.043) (0.12) (0.047)  (0.040)    (0.062) (0.17) (0.094)  (0.059) 
3 Days Local  -0.0912*** -0.131  -0.138***  -0.0787**    -0.190*** -0.0576 -0.254***  -0.102 
   (0.035) (0.17) (0.047)  (0.032)    (0.058) (0.32) (0.061)  (0.075) 
4 Days Local  -0.0908*** -0.0164  -0.119*** -0.0674**    -0.141** 0.0148 -0.252***  -0.0441 
   (0.033) (0.17) (0.043)  (0.033)    (0.055) (0.24) (0.068)  (0.047) 
5 Days Local  -0.0350 -0.134  -0.0955**  -0.0472    0.0227 -0.107  -0.148**  -0.0856 
   (0.037) (0.16) (0.044)  (0.034)    (0.057) (0.26) (0.062)  (0.068) 
0 Days Non-Local  -0.0216** -0.0107  -0.0158 -0.0172*    -0.000539 -0.0136 -0.0414** -0.0215 
   (0.010) (0.043) (0.016)  (0.0097)    (0.012) (0.066) (0.020) (0.015) 
1 Day Non-Local  -0.0380*** 0.0955** -0.0454***  -0.0144   -0.0674*** 0.110 -0.0629***  -0.0328** 
   (0.011) (0.038) (0.013)  (0.0098)    (0.015) (0.075) (0.022) (0.016) 
2 Days Non-Local  -0.0323*** -0.0182 -0.0494***  -0.0214**    -0.0254* -0.0383 -0.0545**  -0.0255* 
   (0.012) (0.037) (0.014)  (0.0099)    (0.015) (0.074) (0.022) (0.015) 
3 Days Non-Local  -0.0121 0.0147  -0.0397***  0.00142    -0.0240 -0.00357 -0.0210 0.00876 
   (0.011) (0.049) (0.013)  (0.0080)    (0.015) (0.066) (0.020) (0.014) 
4 Days Non-Local  -0.0147 0.0464  -0.0311**  -0.00764    -0.00698  -0.0347 -0.0219 -0.0115 
   (0.0090) (0.047)  (0.013)  (0.010)    (0.013) (0.067) (0.017) (0.018) 
5 Days Non-Local  -0.0349*** -0.0223  -0.00640 -0.00420    -0.0339** -0.00972 -0.00502 -0.00826 
   (0.0079) (0.047)  (0.014)  (0.011)    (0.016) (0.069) (0.024) (0.016) 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at 1%; ** indicates significance at 5%; and * indicates significance at 10%.  
Each coefficient comes from a Poisson regression which includes a fixed-effect for each subdistrict-year-month, dummy variables for day of the 
week, and a dummy variable for holidays.  "All attacks" consider any attack with at least one fatality as a terror attack, while "large attacks" 
consider only attacks with at least five casualties. Standard errors are clustered by level of the fixed-effect.    46

















0 Days Local  0.161 0.135 -0.143  -0.0263    0.463 0.382 -0.203  -0.511 
   (0.27) (0.32) (0.19) (0.27)    (0.28) (1.98) (0.20) (2.13) 
1 Day Local  -0.606** -0.339  0.0240  0.129    -0.619 -0.709 -0.105 0.165 
   (0.28) (0.33) (0.17) (0.25)    (1.98) (4.15) (0.33) (0.56) 
2 Days Local  0.0858 0.399* -0.0660 0.284    -0.0175 0.251 -0.695**  -0.273 
   (0.21) (0.21) (0.16) (0.33)    (0.38) (0.48) (0.33) (0.50) 
3 Days Local  0.503** 0.538**  0.131  0.104    0.153 0.307  0.0605  -0.0959 
   (0.22) (0.26) (0.11) (0.15)    (0.29) (2.17) (0.22) (0.51) 
4 Days Local  0.446** 0.0520 -0.259*  0.00998    0.268 0.0976 -0.208 -0.182 
   (0.18) (0.37) (0.16) (0.24)    (0.35) (2.94) (0.31) (0.38) 
5 Days Local  0.127 -0.249  -0.347**  -0.432    0.152 -0.178 -0.310 -0.659 
   (0.24) (0.43) (0.15) (0.36)    (0.31) (2.80) (0.23) (0.69) 
0 Days Non-Local  0.0767 0.0984  0.0737* 0.142    0.0723 0.0913 0.140* 0.0905 
   (0.072) (0.10) (0.041)  (0.090)    (0.14) (0.15)  (0.078)  (0.14) 
1 Day Non-Local  -0.170* -0.165 -0.0252  -0.0601    -0.0751 0.0190 0.0458 0.0166 
   (0.087) (0.10) (0.042)  (0.064)    (0.13) (0.18)  (0.060)  (0.12) 
2 Days Non-Local  -0.0660 -0.0243 -0.100** -0.0751    -0.388** -0.238 -0.205***  -0.313** 
   (0.070) (0.13) (0.041)  (0.083)    (0.16) (0.22)  (0.077)  (0.14) 
3 Days Non-Local  0.0836 0.0479 0.116** 0.103    -0.0904 -0.195 0.0106 -0.0389 
   (0.077) (0.11) (0.052)  (0.074)    (0.14) (0.14)  (0.067)  (0.12) 
4 Days Non-Local  0.0152 -0.0670 0.0210 -0.0284    0.00892 0.00869 0.117** 0.00687 
   (0.077) (0.087) (0.050) (0.093)    (0.12) (0.17)  (0.057)  (0.13) 
5 Days Non-Local  0.00806 0.0267  0.0449  0.157*    0.00790 -0.0951 -0.0173  0.0107 
   (0.082) (0.10) (0.046)  (0.081)    (0.12) (0.19)  (0.060)  (0.11) 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at 1%; ** indicates significance at 5%; and * indicates significance at 10%.  
Each coefficient comes from a Poisson regression which includes a fixed-effect for each subdistrict-year-month, dummy variables for day of the 
week, and a dummy variable for holidays.  "All attacks" consider any attack with at least one fatality as a terror attack, while "large attacks" 
consider only attacks with at least five casualties. Standard errors are clustered by level of the fixed-effect.  
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Murder  Murder 
Acq.  Assault  Aggravated 
Assault 
 
Murder  Murder 
Acq.  Assault  Aggravated 
Assault 
0 Days Local  3.371*** 3.394*** -0.0275  -0.126    3.180*** 3.754*** -0.0496  -0.201 
   (0.12) (0.30)  (0.035)  (0.11)    (0.19) (0.36)  (0.095)  (0.20) 
1 Day Local  0.294 -0.00530  -0.0592*  -0.271**    0.445 0.435  -0.0483  -0.565** 
   (0.38) (4.29)  (0.034)  (0.14)    (0.43) (5.09)  (0.058)  (0.27) 
2 Days Local  -0.822 -12.96***  -0.0376 -0.0607    -16.20*** -11.99*** -0.106**  -0.610 
   (4.19) (1.84)  (0.049)  (0.15)    (1.03) (2.47)  (0.052)  (0.37) 
3 Days Local  -0.416 0.421 0.0287  -0.135    -0.589 0.803 0.0187 0.107 
   (2.16) (0.54)  (0.029)  (0.14)    (7.00) (7.99)  (0.041)  (0.21) 
4 Days Local  -0.234 -0.251  -0.00808  -0.0433    0.435 0.659  0.0394  -0.170 
   (2.16) (7.51)  (0.039)  (0.15)    (2.18) (7.90)  (0.052)  (0.26) 
5 Days Local  0.207 0.298  -0.0162  -0.147    0.0732 0.690 0.0126  0.0341 
   (0.44) (2.27)  (0.033)  (0.12)    (4.32) (7.82)  (0.056)  (0.20) 
0 Days Non-Local  0.295** 0.0972 0.0151*  -0.0699*    0.100 0.191  -0.0132  -0.0596 
   (0.15) (0.21)  (0.0092)  (0.040)    (0.27) (0.37)  (0.021)  (0.058) 
1 Day Non-Local  0.0788 -0.238  -0.00794  -0.0450    0.0584 -0.631  -0.00768  -0.105* 
   (0.11) (0.35)  (0.014)  (0.035)    (0.21) (2.05)  (0.018)  (0.054) 
2 Days Non-Local  -0.0844 -0.271  -0.00789  0.00948    -0.315 -0.311  -0.0256**  -0.0362 
   (0.11) (0.27)  (0.012)  (0.042)    (0.24) (0.46)  (0.013)  (0.052) 
3 Days Non-Local  -0.129 0.305  0.00673  -0.00478    0.380* 0.854***  0.00401  -0.0176 
   (0.12) (0.19)  (0.012)  (0.035)    (0.21) (0.26)  (0.016)  (0.053) 
4 Days Non-Local  -0.0842 -0.410  -0.00151  -0.0103    -0.0287 -0.168  -0.00257  -0.0274 
   (0.15) (0.30)  (0.013)  (0.036)    (0.23) (0.44)  (0.015)  (0.070) 
5 Days Non-Local  0.0586 -0.184 0.0133  -0.0886**    0.109 0.201  0.0104  -0.00434 
   (0.16) (0.31)  (0.0095)  (0.039)    (0.19) (0.39)  (0.016)  (0.063) 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at 1%; ** indicates significance at 5%; and * indicates significance at 10%.  
Each coefficient comes from a Poisson regression which includes a fixed-effect for each subdistrict-year-month, dummy variables for day of the 
week, and a dummy variable for holidays.  "All attacks" consider any attack with at least one fatality as a terror attack, while "large attacks" 
consider only attacks with at least five casualties. Standard errors are clustered by level of the fixed-effect.  
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Appendix Table A5:  Effect of Terror in the Last 5 Days on Crime by Size of Attack, by District Level 
 

















Local Attack  0.0535*  ‐0.0129  0.0484  ‐0.0551    0.0644*  ‐0.0258  0.0665  ‐0.113 
   (0.030)  (0.024)  (0.033)  (0.077)    (0.036)  (0.034)  (0.044)  (0.16) 
Non-Local 
Attack  0.0730***  ‐0.00366  0.0160  0.0309 
 
0.0608***  0.0194  0.0420*  0.0325 
   (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.035)    (0.022)  (0.020)  (0.025)  (0.054) 
  
Burglary Robbery  Auto  Theft  Theft from 
Auto 
 
Burglary Robbery  Auto  Theft  Theft from 
Auto 
Local Attack  ‐0.0564***  0.0525  ‐0.104***  ‐0.0452***    ‐0.0674***  0.0691  ‐0.180***  ‐0.0719** 
   (0.011)  (0.047)  (0.017)  (0.013)    (0.022)  (0.10)  (0.029)  (0.028) 
Non-Local 
Attack  ‐0.0253***  0.00875  ‐0.0247***  ‐0.0141* 
 
‐0.0267***  ‐0.00264  ‐0.0304**  ‐0.0164 
   (0.0084)  (0.028)  (0.0080)  (0.0074)    (0.0077)  (0.036)  (0.014)  (0.011) 
  











Local Attack  0.0687  0.129  ‐0.0660  0.0336    0.0719  0.0864  ‐0.229**  ‐0.145 
   (0.080)  (0.12)  (0.057)  (0.089)    (0.16)  (0.17)  (0.10)  (0.18) 
Non-Local 
Attack  ‐0.0319  ‐0.0569  0.0212  0.00254 
 
‐0.0876  ‐0.0969  0.0342  ‐0.0434 
   (0.048)  (0.054)  (0.035)  (0.066)    (0.065)  (0.10)  (0.039)  (0.075) 
  
Murder  Murder 
Acq.  Assault  Aggravated 
Assault 
 
Murder  Murder Acq.  Assault  Aggravated 
Assault 
Local Attack  1.113***  1.227***  0.000243  ‐0.0516    1.202***  1.955***  ‐0.0147  ‐0.150** 
   (0.089)  (0.19)  (0.012)  (0.035)    (0.15)  (0.31)  (0.025)  (0.073) 
Non-Local 
Attack  ‐0.00347  ‐0.189  0.00349  ‐0.0211 
 
0.00936  0.0215  ‐0.00405  ‐0.0302 
   (0.076)  (0.14)  (0.0072)  (0.020)    (0.088)  (0.22)  (0.0088)  (0.033) 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at 1%; ** indicates significance at 5%; and * indicates significance at 10%.  
Each coefficient comes from a Poisson regression which includes a fixed-effect for each district-year-month (six districts), dummy variables for day 
of the week, and a dummy variable for holidays.  "All attacks" consider any attack with at least one fatality as a terror attack, while "large attacks" 
consider only attacks with at least five casualties. Standard errors are clustered by level of the fixed-effect.  
 
 